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Volume XV FEBRUARY, 1940 Number 3
CONSTITUTION MAKING BY THE SUPREME
COURT SINCE MARCH 29, 1937
By HUGH EVANDER WILLIS
This period marks an epoch in judicial history. On the
date marking the beginning of the period the judicial winds
violently shifted. In the years immediately preceding, con-
stitutional law had largely been made by Justices Butler,
McReynolds, Van Devanter, Sutherland, and Roberts. In
the years of this period constitutional law has largely been
made by Justices Brandeis, Cardozo, Chief Justice Hughes,
and Justice Roberts. The decisions in this last period stand
out in striking contrast to the decisions just prior thereto.
In the years preceding 1937 the Supreme Court had upheld
some striking legislation like the gold clauses legislation,' the
Tennessee Valley Authority legislation,2 and prison made
goods legislation 3 of Congress, state moratorium legislation4
and legislation regulating prices outside of public utilities; but
in general the position of the court had been against social
1Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 294 U. S. 240 (1935); Nortz v.
United States, 294 U. S. 317 (1935); Perry v. United States, 294 U. S. 330
(1935).
2 Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U. S. 288 (1936).
3 Whitfield v. State of Ohio, 297 U. S. 431 (1936); Kentucky Whip & Collar
Co. v. Illinois Central R. Co., 299 U. S. 334 (1937).
4 Home B. & L. Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U S. 398 (1934) ; Nebbia v. People
of the State of New York, 291 U. S. 502 (1934).
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control. It once had gone so far as to adopt spot reproduc-
tion cost as the rate base5 and a rate of return of 8% 6 for
determination of reasonable compensation for a public utility;
and just before 1937 it was assuming a more and more antag-
onistic attitude towards New Deal legislation, declaring un-
constitutional7 a state minimum wage law and the federal
Agricultural Adjustment Act8 as well as the Railroad Retire-
ment Pension Act. 9 At the end of March, 1937, all this was
changed. The Supreme Court began to reverse many impor-
tant prior decisions and to make in many respects a new and
different constitution. The dissents of Holmes, Brandeis,
Clark, Stone, and Cardozo now became the doctrines of the
Court, and the former majority members of the Court became
the dissenting members. So great were the changes in con-
stitutional law that many violent reactions were caused. The
Honorable Frank J. Hogan when President of the American
Bar Association was filled with alarm and thought our Con-
stitution was being overturned and destroyed.' 0 The Honor-
able Robert H. Jackson, Solicitor General of the United
States, looked upon the changes with approval and thought
that the Court was going back to the original Constitution."
The date of March 29, 1937, has been chosen as the date
marking the beginning of this period because it is upon this
date that occurred the constitutional conversion of Justice
Roberts. His conversion may have occurred some days be-
fore this, but no public announcement of his conversion was
made until this date. This announcement occurred in the case
of the decision of the Supreme Court in West Coast Hotel Co.
v. Parrish,'2 in which in an opinion written by Chief Justice
Hughes, concurred in by Justices Roberts, Stone, Brandeis,
and Cardozo, and to which Justices Sutherland, Butler,
5 McCardle v. Indianapolis Water Co., 272 U. S. 400 (1926).
6 United Railway & Electric Co. of Baltimore v. West, 280 U. S. 234 (1930).
7 Morehead v. People of New York, 298 U. S. 587 (1936).
8 United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1 (1936).
9 Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton R. Co., 295 U. S. 330 (1935).
10 15 A. B. A. 629.
1115 A. B. A. 745.
12 300 U. S. 379 (1937).
180
CONSTITUTION MAKING BY THE SUPREME COURT
McReynolds, and Van Devanter dissented, the Court upheld
a state minimum wage law and overruled the prior decision
of the Supreme Court in Adkins v. Children's Hospital,13 and
inferentially the case of Morehead v. People of New York. 14
Whether or not Justice Roberts' conversion was caused by the
evangelical work of the President or of the Chief Justice will
never be known; but that a conversion took place, there can
be no shadow of doubt. Since that time the President has
appointed Justices Black, Reed, Frankfurter, and Douglas to
the supreme bench, all of whom are supposed to be liberally
inclined; but the liberality of the Court was determined by
the decision of the Court in the minimum wage case to which
reference has just been made.
We shall now briefly refer to the epoch-making decisions
of the Supreme Court since March 29, 1937, classifying and
discussing them under appropriate headings.
SEPARATION OF POWERS
The decision of the Supreme Court working the greatest
change in our doctrine of separation of powers has been the
decision of O'Malley v. Woodrough.15 The opinion in this
case was written by Justice Frankfurter. Justice Butler was
the lone dissenter, because Justice McReynolds took no part
and before the decision in this case Justices Van Devanter and
Sutherland had resigned. In this case the court has held that
an income tax upon the salary of a federal judge was not a
diminution of his salary contrary to the provision in the Con-
stitution that their compensation "shall not be diminished
during their continuance in office." This case has expressly
overruled the case of Miles v. Graham,"6 the opinion in which
was written by Justice McReynolds, and has impliedly over-
ruled the case of Evans v. Gore,17 the opinion in which was
written by Justice Van Devanter.
13261 U. S. 525 (1923). 15307 U. S. 277 (1939).
14 298 U. S. 587 (1936). 16 268 U. S. 501 (1925).
17 253 U. S. 245 (1920). The difference between Evans v. Gorse and Miles
v. Graham was that in the latter the judge was appointed after the enactment
of the tax statute, and in the former the judge was appointed before the enact-
ment of the tax statute.
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In Shields v. Utah Idaho Central R. Co., 18 Chief Justice
Hughes writing the opinion, the Supreme Court has held it
was a constitutional delegation of authority to give the Inter-
state Commerce Commission power to determine whether or
not a particular electric railway was an interurban railway.
In United States v. Rock Royal Co-op.' 9 the Supreme Court
has permitted Congress to delegate to the Secretary of Agri-
culture the power to determine the details of a legislative
scheme. These cases show a liberality in the matter of the
delegation of legislative power; but it should be remembered
that in these cases there has been no attempt to delegate
governmental authority to private individuals as was true in
the Schechter case 20 and in the Panama case.21
The Supreme Court in this period also has held that Con-
gress has the power to determine the jurisdiction of the lower
federal courts.22
DUAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT
So far as the quantity of its decisions are concerned, the
Supreme Court in this period has done more work on the
doctrine of a dual form of government than it has upon any
other part of our Constitution.
One of the most significant changes which it has made in
our dual form of government has related to the matter of
governmental taxation. Here it has substituted a doctrine
of reciprocal taxation by each of the other for an old doctrine
of reciprocal immunity of both the states and federal govern-
ment from taxation by each other. This doctrine of reciprocal
18 305 U. S. 177 (1938).
19 307 U. S. 533 (1939).
20 A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495 (1935).
It should be noted that the N. R. A. which was involved in this decision was
not the product of President Roosevelt or the New Deal, but it was a product
of the United States Chamber of Commerce, except for the provision in regard
to collective bargaining, suggested by Secretary Perkins, and the men most
active in its authorship were H. I. Harriman, P. W. Litchfield, and Gerard
Swope. This plan was all worked out and published during the Hoover
administration.
21Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388 (1934).
22 Federal Power Commission v. Pacific P. & L. Co., 307 U. S. 156 (1939).
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taxation has gradually been worked out in the case of James
v. Dravo Contracting Co.,23 where the Supreme Court upheld
a state income and gross sales tax upon a contractor building
a dam for the federal government; in the case of Helvering
v. Gerhardt,24 in which the Supreme Court allowed the federal
government to tax an employee of the state of New York
working for the Port of New York Authority; in the case of
Allen v. Regents of University System of Ga.,25 in which the
Supreme Court permitted the federal government to tax ath-
letic admissions charged by a state; in the case of Graves v.
People of New York ex rel. O'Keefe2 8 where the Supreme
Court permitted the state of New York to levy a tax upon
the salary of an employee of the federal Home Owners Loan
Corporation; and in the case of State Tax Commission of
Utah v. Pan Cott,27 in which the Supreme Court permitted
the state of Utah to tax the salary of an attorney of the
Reconstruction Finance Corporation and the Regional Agri-
cultural Credit Corporation. The opinions in these cases have
been written by Chief Justice Hughes and Justices Stone and
Roberts. Justices Butler and McReynolds have been con-
sistent dissenters. In the case of James v. Dravo Contracting
Co. Justice Roberts temporarily backslid and also dissented.
The doctrine of reciprocal immunity from taxation had been
established by the case of Collector v. Day, which apparently
abolished the doctrine of federal supremacy in the field of dual
taxation as it had been established by Chief Justice Marshall
in the case of M'Culloch v. Maryland.29 These recent cases
have expressly overruled the case of Collector v. Day. How-
ever, the doctrine of federal supremacy in the field of taxa-
tion seems again to have been reestablished by the Court in
the case of Pittman v. Home Owners Loan Corporation,"0
23 302 U. S. 134 (1937).
24 304 U. S. 405 (1938).
25 304 U. S. 439 (1938).
26306 U. S. 466 (1939).
27 306 U. S. 511 (1939).
28 11 Wall. 113 (1870).
29 4 Wheat. 316 (1819).
30 60 S. Ct. 15 (1939).
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where it was held that Congress has the power to protect a
corporation created by it against state taxation.
In the case of United States v. Butler3' the Supreme Court
prior to 1937 had held that the federal government could not
use a tax power which it possessed to invade a state's police
power, although it still recognized the doctrine of federal
supremacy over the states as against private individuals when
the federal taxing power came into conflict with the states'
taxing power or when the federal government's police power
came into conflict with the states' police power,82 and per-
mitted the federal taxing power to be used for federal police
power purposes. 33  Since 1937 it has gradually been over-
throwing the doctrine of the case of United States v. Butler.
In Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co.34 and Charles C.
Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis,3 5 over the strong dissent of
Justices Butler, McReynolds, Sutherland, and Van Devanter,
the Court has upheld the federal Social Security Act and a
state act passed to satisfy the prerequisites of the federal act,
on the theory that the federal government was not using its
taxing power to coerce the states. And in Mulford v. Smith8
the Court in an opinion written by Justice Roberts, who also
wrote the opinion in United States v. Butler, has upheld the
second federal A. A. A. because it was held to be a regulation
of interstate commerce, although it was practically as sweep-
ing as the first A. A. A.
No other topic affects the relation between the states and
the federal government more vitally than that of interstate
commerce. In the period under discussion the Supreme Court
has more or less made over constitutional law upon the
subject.
In the Carter Coal case 7 the Schechter case,33 and espe-
31297 U. S. 1 (1936).
32 Houston & Texas Ry. v. United States, 234 U. S. 342 (1914).
33 Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United States, 301 U. S. 308 (1937).
34 301 U. S. 495 (1937).
35 301 U. S. 548 (1937).
36 307 U. S. 38.
37 Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238 (1936).
38 A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495 (1935).
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cially in the case of Hammer v. Dagenhart39 the Supreme
Court had been taking a narrower and narrower view of what
was interstate commerce in order to limit the power of the
federal government, but in the case of National Labor Rela-
tions Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.40 and the case of
Associated Press v. National Labor Relations Bd.,41 against
the vigorous dissent of Justices Butler, McReynolds, Van
Devanter, and Sutherland, the Supreme Court has very greatly
enlarged the powers of the federal government, both by
enlarging the scope of interstate commerce, so as to make it
reach back even into production, and by emphasizing the power
of the federal government to foster and protect interstate
commerce. As a result of these decisions and the prison
made goods decisions, it now must be taken for granted that
the first child labor case of Hammer v. Dagenhart and the
other cases referred to have been impliedly overruled. The
doctrine of the Jones & Laughlin case has later been applied
to holding companies controlling gas and electric companies
42
and to manufacturers.4 3 In the rirginian Railway Company
v. System Federation No. 4044 the Court has upheld the pro-
visions of the Railway Labor Act requiring collective bargain-
ing, and it has also upheld the provisions of the federal
Tobacco Inspection Law.4
5
At the same time the Supreme Court has been increasing
the power of the federal government to regulate interstate
commerce, it also has increased the power of the state govern-
ments to exercise their police power even though it affected
interstate commerce. Thus it has permitted the state of
Indiana to require a license for the transportation of dead
39 247 U. S. 251 (1918).
40 301 U. S. 1 (1937).
41301 U. S. 103 (1937).
42 Electric Bond & Share Co. v. Securities & Exch. Commission, 303 U. S.
419 (1938) ; Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Bd., 305 U. S.
197 (1938).
43 National Labor Relations Bd. v. Fainblatt, 306 U. S. 601 (1939) ; National
Labor Relations Bd. v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U. S. 240 (1939).
44 300 U. S. 515 (1937).
45 Currin v. Wallace, 306 U. S. 1 (1939).
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animals from the state of Indiana into other states although
the state did not prohibit the transportation of such animals
into the state ;46 the state of Washington to inspect and regu-
late motor driven tugs engaged in interstate and foreign com-
merce in the absence of regulation by Congress ;47 and the
state of Pennsylvania to regulate the milk industry and fix
minimum prices for milk though a part of the milk was to
be shipped to another state ;48 but the Supreme Court has
declared unconstitutional an inspection statute of Florida be-
cause it exacted an excessive fee, sixty times the actual cost of
inspection.49
In the same way the Supreme Court has been very liberal
in the matter of state taxation. Thus it has permitted the
state of New Mexico to levy a tax for the privilege of pre-
paring, printing, and publishing magazine advertisements, even
though such advertisements were intended to circulate in
interstate commerce, 50 and has permitted the states to levy
use taxes for the use of property after it has come to rest in
the state ;51 but the Supreme Court is still of the opinion that
a gross receipts tax on receipts from interstate commerce is
too much of a burden upon interstate commerce. 2
Nothing has had a more radical effect upon our dual form
of government as it was established by the commerce clause
than has the Twenty-first Amendment. The necessity for
stopping the trade barriers and conflicts between the various
states and the need of federal regulation of commerce were
undoubtedly the most impelling reasons for bringing the
colonies to the point where they would adopt the new federal
Constitution. The Twenty-first Amendment runs counter to
48 Clason v. Indiana, 306 U. S. 439 (1939).
47 Kelly v. Washington ex rel. Foss Co., 302 U. S. 1 (1937).
48 Milk Control Bd. v. Eisenberg Farm Products, 306 U. S. 436 (1939). Cf.
Baldwin v. Seelig, 294 U. S. 511 (1935).
49 Hale v. Bimco Trade, Inc., 306 U. S. 375 (1939).
50 Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U. S. 250 (1938).
51 Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U. S. 577 (1937); Southern P. Co.
v. Gallagher, 306 U. S. 167 (1939).
52J. D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U. S. 307 (1938); Gwin, White &
Prince v. Henneford, 305 U. S. 434 (1939).
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this main philosophy of the Constitution and has tended to
restore so far as traffic in intoxicating liquors is concerned all
the evils which it was the purpose of the Constitution to
destroy in the commerce clause. Because of the weasel words
"in violation of the laws thereof" found in Section 2 of the
Twenty-first Amendment, the Supreme Court has held, as it
had to hold, that the Twenty-first Amendment is not limited
by the commerce clause 53 or the equality clause 54 or by the
due process clause. 55 In other words the police power of the
state is absolutely supreme so far as concerns interstate
commerce.56
The first case cited above was decided prior to 1937 but
all the cases since have been in accord. The consequence is
that the Twenty-first Amendment is encouraging and produc-
ing all of the evil consequences which it was one of the main
purposes of the Constitution to stop. The power of the states
under the Twenty-first Amendment adds to the power which
they already had through inspection laws and incidental police
power, so that now the states are beginning to set up all sorts
of barriers to free trade between the states, and commerce
from one state to another is even made to pass through ports
of entry.
In this period the Supreme Court has further strengthened
the money power of the federal government by holding in
Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. Henwood57 that bonds
are payable in legal tender of the United States though there
is therein a promise to pay in foreign currency, thus further
making private contracts subject to the police power of the
federal government. In United States v. Bekins53 the Court
held a subdivision of the state might take advantage of the
provisions of the bankruptcy act after the state had given its
53 State Bd of Equalization v. Young's Market Co., 299 U. S. 59 (1936);
Joseph S. Finch & Co. v. McKittrick, 305 U. S. 395 (1939)
54 Mahoney v. Joseph Triner Corp., 304 U. S. 401 (1938).
55 Indianapolis Brewing Co. v. Liquor Control Commission, 305 U. S. 391
(1939).
uS Zeffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 60 S. Ct. 163 (1939).
57 307 U. S. 247 (1939).
58 304 U. S. 27 (1938).
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consent, thus settling a point not expressly decided by the
case of Ashton v. Cameron County District.39 The constitu-
tionality of the Tennessee Valley Authority has been further
upheld in the case of Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. Tennes-
see Valley Authority,6 0 in which the court held that private
public utilities did not have a right to free competition and
that they could not therefore enjoin its competition with them
either on the ground of the unconstitutionality of the Tennes-
see Valley Authority Act or because of illegal practices because
the evidence did not show any such practices. Justices Butler
and McReynolds dissented in all these cases and in the money
power case they were also joined by the Chief Justice and
Justice Stone.
In the case of Pacific Employers Insurance Co. v. Industrial
Ac. Com. of California,6 1 the Court has held that the full faith
and credit clause does not require one state to substitute for
its own compensation law the compensation law of another
state in the case of persons and events within it, though such
other statute would be applied by the other state in a suit
therein involving the same persons and events. This decision
has put a slight modification on the case of Bradford Electric
Light Co. v. Clapper62 and limits the application of the full
faith and credit clause to state statutes not obnoxious to the
policy of another state.
SUPREMACY OF THE SUPREME COURT
Perhaps the most sensational decision of the Supreme
Court in the present period of constitutional law has been
the case of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins.63 This decision touches
our dual form of government as well as the supremacy of the
Supreme Court, but perhaps it is better to treat it under the
latter heading. This case overruled the case of Swift v.
Tyson.6 4
59298 U. S. 513 (1936).
60 306 U. S. 118 (1939).
61306 U. S. 493 (1939).
62286 U. S. 145 (1932)
63 304- U. S. 64 (1938).
64 16 Pet. 1 (1842).
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Swift v. Tyson had established the rule that in diversity of
citizenship cases wherever there was a question of general or
commercial interest, the federal courts would not follow the
judge-made law of the highest courts of the states but would
make their own common law upon the subject. Erie R. Co.
v. Tompkins has theoretically changed this rule and now
requires all the federal courts to apply in such cases not a
federal common law but the common law of that state in which
the particular federal court is sitting. The Supreme Court in
this case placed its decision not on the ground that Swift v.
Tyson had incorrectly interpreted the conformity act of Con-
gress, but that it had rendered an unconstitutional decision in
holding that the judicial power of the United States included
the power to decide substantive law.
The rule of Swift v. Tyson had been followed for almost
one hundred years, and was intended to give the people of
the United States a general, uniform body of common law
where federal jurisdiction attached. Justice Brandeis, who
wrote the opinion in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, urged that the
rule of Swift v. Tyson created a well of uncertainty. This
was true only where the amount involved was less than $3,000,
so the federal jurisdiction could not attach, and where the
amount involved was close to $3,000 so that a plaintiff might
choose either federal jurisdiction or state jurisdiction by vary-
ing the amount of his claim. Now there will be a well of
uncertainty where the amount involved is over $3,000. Not
only this but the federal courts have never thought of follow-
ing state decisions where the federal question is involved and
in a case decided since the Erie R. Case the court has said
that it is going to continue to follow this procedure. 65 Where
the state courts have not as yet decided a question and where
the decisions of a state court are in conflict, the federal courts
will also probably continue to decide common law questions
according to their own view. 66
65 Lyeth v. Hoey, 305 U. S. 188 (1938).
66 Sohn v. Waterson, 17 Wall. 596 (1873) ; Thompson et al. v. Consolidated
Gas Utilities Corp., et al., 300 U. S. 55 (1937); Folsom v. Township 96, 159
U. S. 611 (1895).
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But worse than this, in such questions as the termination of
the common law liability of a common carrier and the change
by contract of the common law liability of a common carrier,
a question of conflict of laws is involved where there is as
yet no state conflict of laws upon the subject. Will the Supreme
Court in such case make a rule of conflict of laws? If it does,
there is a likelihood that we shall again be back about where
we were before the case of Swift v. Tyson was overruled. In
any event it may well be asked why is there any advantage in
having two different rules followed by the United States
Supreme Court according to whether the case comes before
it from a state supreme court or from a lower federal court.
It is submitted that this recent case by a liberal court has some
earmarks of being a very non-liberal and non-progressive
case, and that the dissenting conservative Justices Butler and
McReynolds came nearer having the right of it than the great
liberal Justice Brandeis.
PROTECTION OF PERSONAL LIBERTY AGAINST SOCIAL
CONTROL
(Private Right v. Public Authority)
The present, like other periods of constitutional history,
has laid much stress upon the doctrine of the protection of
personal liberty against what the Supreme Court regards
unreasonable social control.
Shortly before the present period in the case of Colgate v.
Harvey6" and in an opinion written by Justice Sutherland, the
Supreme Court extended the scope of the United States privi-
leges and immunities clause to cover the "privilege of acquir-
ing, owning, and receiving income from investments outside
the state," thus seemingly protecting both the fundamental
rights, powers, privileges, and immunities of the Bill of
Rights and all the fundamental rights, powers, privileges,
and immunities of the common law. This was a startling
decision. It reversed a policy, which had continued from the
time of the Slaughter-House Cases,68 to confine the scope of
68 16 Wall. 36 (1873).67 296 U. S. 401 (1935).
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the United States privileges and immunities clause to the pro-
tection of only those interests which grew out of the relation-
ship of the citizen to the national government. Justice Miller
was largely responsible for this policy. It is true that in
the eighties Justice Fields succeeded in extending the scope
of the due process clause to cover the territory denied the
United States privileges and immunities clause, but it was
startling nevertheless to have the scope of the United States
privileges and immunities clause thus extended at this late
date. Justices Stone, Brandeis, and Cardozo dissented.
Whether or not the doctrine announced in Colgate v. Harvey
will continue to stand is questionable. In the case of Breed-
love v. Suttles"9 the Supreme Court said "the privileges and
immunities protected" under this clause "are only those that
arise from the Constitution and laws of the United States
and not those that spring from other sources" and never
referred to the case of Colgate v. Harvey. The question of
the scope of the United States privileges and immunities came
up again in the caes of Hague v. Committee for Industrial
Organization"° where the question was whether the privileges
to peaceably assemble and to discuss such legislation as the
National Labor Relations Act were privileges and immunities
of United States citizenship. Only three of the Justices (Rob-
erts, Black, and Hughes) were able to agree that they were.
Justices Stone and Reed took the position that they were not,
but that they were protected by due process of law. Justices
Roberts and Black and Chief Justice Hughes concurred as to
due process of law. Justices McReynolds and Butler dis-
sented on both grounds. It would therefore seem that the
decision of the case was under the due process clause and
that the court almost repudiated the doctrine first announced
by Colgate v. Harvey. Justices Frankfurter and Douglas did
not take any part in the decision of Hague v. Committee for
Industrial Organization. Perhaps the safest guess is that
when they do participate in any new decision involving the
United States privileges and immunities clause, the Supreme
Court will expressly repudiate the case of Colgate v. Harvey.
69 302 U. S. 277 (1937). 70 307 U. S. 496 (1939).
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In the case of Wright v. Finton Branch Bank71 the Supreme
Court has upheld the second Frazier-Lemke Act not only as
a bankruptcy act but as not impairing the obligation of the
contract between mortgagor and mortgagee so as to violate
the due process clause; although in the case of Louisville Joint
Stock Land Bank v. Radford,72 the court had declared the first
Frazier-Lemke Act unconstitutional. The court found the
second Frazier-Lemke Act reasonable because it provided for
the preservation of the creditor's lien, his right to realize upon
security by judicial sale, and his right to bid at such sale. In
the case of Honeyman v. Jacobs73 the Supreme Court has held
that changing a remedy does not impair the obligation of a
contract.
In United States v. Powers74 the Supreme Court has held
that an amendatory criminal act continuing in effect another
act which had expired was not an ex post facto law.
An interesting application of the equal protection of laws
clause has occurred in this period. In the case of State of
Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada7 5 Chief Justice Hughes,
writing for the Court, said that the state of Missouri violated
this clause in failing to give legal education to negroes when
it afforded such education to white residents although it pro-
vided for the payment of tuition for such negroes outside the
state. The Court held that the obligation of the state to
refrain from discrimination could be performed only within its
own jurisdiction. Justices Butler and McReynolds dissented.
However, in the case of Great Altlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v.
Grosjean76 the Supreme Court, through Justice Roberts, has
announced that it was proper classification to tax chain stores
by a license tax according to the number of units within the
state and to base the rate per unit on the total number of units
within and without the state. Justices Butler and McReynolds,
as well as Justice Sutherland, also dissented in this case.
71 300 U. S. 440 (1937).
72295 U. S. 555 (1935).
73306 U. S. 539 (1939).
74307 U. S. 214 (1939).
75305 U. S. 337 (1938).
76301 U. S. 412 (1937).
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The most important due process decision of this period has
been West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish.77 In this case the
Supreme Court has upheld a statute of the state of Washing-
ton passed prior to the decision of Idkins v. Children's Hos-
pital 87 providing for the establishment of minimum wages for
women; and expressly overruled the case of Adkins v. Chil-
dren's Hospital and perhaps impliedly overruled the case of
Morehead v. New York. 7 9 The statute was held to be a
proper exercise of the police power because of the social inter-
est in the health and the economic welfare of women. The
opinion was written by Chief Justice Hughes. Justices Suth-
erland, Van Devanter, McReynolds, and Butler dissented. In
this period the Court has also extended the protection of due
process of law to the privilege of peaceable assemblage as
well as to the privilege of freedom of speech and of press.
This was done in the case of DeJonge v. Oregon,80 which
involved a criminal syndicalism law and the case of Hague v.
Committee for Industrial Organization,8s which involved the
National Labor Relations Act. Justices Butler and McReyn-
olds dissented in the Hague case but not in the DeJonge case.
In the case of Schneider v. State of New Jersey 2 the Supreme
Court has extended the protection of the due process clause
to the distribution of handbills on the streets and the distribu-
tion of circulars from house to house as forms of freedom
of speech and of the press. In the case of Driscoll v. Edison
Light & Power Co.8 3 the Supreme Court had an opportunity
to think through in a rational fashion the problem of how to
determine reasonable compensation for a public utility and to
attempt to decide what are a reasonable and scientific rate
base and rate of return for that purpose. The doing of such
a job would have, of course, required the repudiation of such
77 300 U. S. 379 (1937).
S8261 U. S. 525 (1923).
79 298 U. S. 587 (1936).
80 299 U. S. 353 (1937).
81 307 U. S. 496 (1939).
82 60 S. Ct. 146 (1939).
88 307 U. S. 104 (1939).
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cases as Smyth v. Imes, 4 McCardle v. Indianapolis Water
Co.,85 and United Railways of Baltimore v. West.88  How-
ever, the Supreme Court preferred to continue to wallow in
the uncertainties of the rule as to rate base announced in
Smyth v. A4mes, and not to reconsider the whole question of
a reasonable rate of return, although Justice Frankfurter
wrote a concurring opinion attacking the case of Smyth v.
Ames, and Justice Black concurred in this opinion. However,
in Falvoline Oil Co. v. United States87 the Court has held that
pipe line companies are common carriers though they carry
only to their own refineries; and in Union Stock Yard &
Transit Co. v. United States88 that stock yard companies are
common carriers though not owning any railroad tracks but
only platforms and chutes used in loading and unloading live
stock shipped by rail in interstate commerce.
Due process as a matter of jurisdiction has had considerable
development in this period. In the case of Guaranty Trust
Co. of New York v. Commonwealth of Virginia89 the Court
had no difficulty in permitting the state of Virginia to tax the
receipe of income within Virginia, by a citizen residing there
although the state of New York had already taxed the fund
from which the payments were to be made. This was taxing
two different privileges. But when it came to the taxation of
the same privilege by different states the Court had more
difficulty. In a long line of prior decisions culminating in the
case of First National Bank of Boston v. Maine,00 the Supreme
Court had tried to stop multiple taxation of intangibles (as
well as land and tangibles) by the different states, by holding
that it was a violation of due process as a matter of jurisdic-
tion. Justices Stone, Holmes, and Brandeis dissented to this
doctrine. In the recent cases of Curry v. McCanless91 and
84 169 U. S. 466 (1899).
85 272 U. S. 400 (1926).
86 280 U. S. 234 (1930).
87 60 S. Ct. 160 (1939).
88 60 S. Ct. 193 (1939).
89 305 U. S. 19 (1938).
90284 U. S. 312 (1932).
91 307 U. S. 357 (1939).
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Graves v. Elliott92 the Supreme Court in opinions by Justice
Stone has adopted the view of the former dissenting judges
and held that different considerations apply to the taxation of
intangibles from what apply to the taxation of tangibles, and
that "where a taxpayer extends his activities with respect to
his intangibles, so as to avail himself of the protection and
benefit of the laws of another state, in such a way as to bring
his person or property within the reach of the tax gatherer
there, the reason for a single place of taxation no longer
obtains, and the rule 'mobilia sequuntur personam' is not con-
trolling." Chief Justice Hughes and Justice Roberts joined
Justices Butler and McReynolds in dissenting. In Boteler v.
Ingels93 the Supreme Court has upheld a statute of Congress
making a bankrupt estate liable for automobile license fees
and penalties imposed by a state and incurred by the trustee
in operating the bankrupt's business. In Pearson v. McGraw94
the Supreme Court has held that a state may levy an inheritance
tax on an irrevocable trust executed in that state of federal
reserve notes bought and located in another state. In the case
of Jlorcester County Trust Co. v. Riley9" the Supreme Court
has held that state taxing officials cannot be interpleaded in a
federal court with the tax officials of another state likewise
claiming domicile and the rigth to tax, in order to have the
federal court determine which state is in fact domiciliary and
enjoining taxing by the court of the other state, because such
a suit was in effect a suit against the state. But the Court in
State of Texas v. State of Florida96 has permitted one state
to interplead others for the purpose of determining which of
four states was the true domicile of a party so as to permit
such state to impose death taxes on decedent's intangibles,
where the net estate was not sufficient to pay the amount of
taxes assessed on the basis of domicile by the four states.
However, the Supreme Court in Commonwealth of Massa-
92 307 U. S. 383 (1939).
93 60 S. Ct. 29 (1939).
94 60 S. Ct. 211 (1939).
95 302 U. S. 292 (1937).
96 306 U. S. 398 (1939).
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chusetts v. State of Missouri97 has held that it has no original
jurisdiction over a suit by one state against another to have
a question of domicile determined when the securities were suf-
ficient to cover the claims of both states.
UNIVERSAL CITIZENSHIP AND SUFFRAGE
In the case of Kessler v. Sirecker98 the Supreme Court has
added to the doctrine of universal citizenship and suffrage by
holding that, under a statute requiring deportation of any
alien who at any time after entering the United States is found
to have been at the time of entry or who became thereafter a
member of an organization which advocates the overthrow
of the United States government by force, an alien is not
subject to deportation merely because of past membership in
such an organization. Justices McReynolds and Butler dis-
sented. In the case of Hague v. Committee for Industrial
Organization99 the Court has indicated that it again was going
to put a narrow construction upon the United States privileges
and immunities clause. In Chippewa Indians v. United
States100 the Supreme Court has held that giving citizenship
to Indians does not terminate the United States' guardianship
over them. In Lane v. Wilson'0 the Supreme Court has again
protected the negro against discrimination in the matter of
voting found in a registration law only slightly modifying a
former "grandfather clause" law. Justices McReynolds and
Butler disagreed with the rest of the Court. In Perkins v.
Elg10 2 the Court has held that a child born in the United States
does not lose his United States citizenship by the expatriation
of his parents.
AMENDMENT
In the case of Coleman v. Miller"3 the Supreme Court has
held that what is the reasonable time for the ratification of a
97 60 S. Ct. 39 (1939).
98 307 U. S. 22 (1939).
99 307 U. S. 496 (1939).
1003 07 U. S. 1 (1939).
101 307 U. S. 268 (1939).
102 307 U. S. 325 (1939).
108 307 U. S. 433 (1939).
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proposed amendment to the United States Constitution is a
political question for Congress. This is a position contrary
to the position taken by the Court in the case of Dillon v.
Gloss.104 Justices Butler and McReynolds dissented in the
case of Coleman v. Miller. This case also affects the doctrine
of separation of powers in that the Supreme Court by practic-
ing self-denial has conferred upon Congress a power which it
itself exercised in the case of Dillon v. Gloss.
CONCLUSION
After this survey of the Supreme Court decisions since
March 29, 1937, there can be only one opinion as to whether
this period has been epoch-making. During this short time
the Supreme Court has rewritten a large part of our Con-
stitution, at least as it existed just prior to this date. It has
changed many of the constitutional doctrines established in
his prior period and introduced new doctrines. Things which
were unconstitutional prior to this date are no longer uncon-
stitutional, and things which were constitutional are now un-
constitutional. In this short period more than twelve prior
constitutional decisions have been overruled. A remarkable
record l If these prior decisions were good decisions, men
like Mr. Hogan may well be filled with alarm. If, however,
the decisions overruled were bad and the overruling decisions
good, there is no reason for alarm but for congratulation.
For this reason the real question is not how many decisions
have been overruled, but whether the decisions in the present
period have been right or have been wrong.
All fair-minded men will agree that the decision was right
which permitted the taxation of the salaries of federal judges.
All will agree with Justice Holmes that it is no diminution
of the salary of a judge when he is required to pay only the
same taxes that all other citizens in the community pay. As
to whether the decisions permitting a greater delegation of
legislative power are right or wrong is a matter of opinion.
The doctrine of separation of powers permits, and always has
104 256 U. S. 368 (1921).
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permitted, a certain amount of delegation of legislative power.
It is simply a matter of degree. The permission of reciprocal
taxation by the states and the federal government of each
other is not objectionable so long as the taxation is not dis-
criminatory. In the first place the only reason for tax im-
munity was to prevent such discrimination. The decision on
the second A. A. A. only restored the doctrine of federal
supremacy to a position from which it should never have been
taken. In its interstate commerce decisions the Supreme
Court, both so far as the power of the United States and so
far as the power of the states is concerned, has only taken us
back to the doctrines of Chief Justice Marshall. Justices
Butler, McReynolds, Van Devanter and Sutherland in their
interstate commerce decisions had been trying to protect bus-
iness from any social control either by the states or by the
United States. It was never the philosophy of the Constitu-
tion to do any such thing. The most recent legal tender
decision also is in accord with all legal tender decisions except
the first, and has taken us back to the position of Justice
Miller. The decision on the full faith and credit clause must
be regarded to have introduced a wise modification of another
full faith and credit decision. If the most recent decisions
on the United States privileges and immunities clause are
correcting the decision in Colgate v. Harvey, they also are to
the good and are taking us back to the position established by
Justice Miller. The protection of the negroes under the
equality clause also is in accord with prior decisions, and the
position of the dissenters in this case should be compared with
their position in the Chain Store Taxation case. The due
process decision upholding minimum wage laws must be held
to be a good decision since both great political parties came
out against the decisions which it overruled-the Democratic
party in its platform and the Republican party through its
presidential candidate. The decisions involving assemblage
and freedom of speech and the press will hardly be condemned
in the United States after what has happened to these privi-
leges in other parts of the world. The change in the law
as to jurisdiction for the taxation of intangibles is only
CONSTITUTION MAKING BY THE SUPREME COURT
another illustration of a bit of realism. The Citizenship cases
are hard to condemn by any people free from bias and pre-
judice.
The decisions on the Twenty-first Amendment are enough
to fill good citizens with alarm, but the Supreme Court cannot
be blamed for these decisions. The blame must rest with
those who put the Twenty-first Amendment in the United
States Constitution. Some people may doubt the wisdom of
the decision in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, but the chances are
that opinion on this subject is pretty evenly divided. The
Court perhaps may be criticised for its decision on the rate
of return and rate base for public utility regulation; but if so,
it will have to be criticised not for what it has done, since this
decision was in accord with prior decisions, but for what it
has not done but should have done. Here the Court was not
liberal enough. But this was not one of the decisions filling
with alarm men like Mr. Hogan. The decision on the question
of amendment favoring making the matter a political instead
of a judicial question may also arouse a difference of opinion,
but certainly it is no cause for alarm.
The only conclusion to which it is possible to come, there-
fore, is that the decisions in the last three years have been good
decisions, and that they are no cause for anybody getting
alarmed. If so, it would seem to follow that the decisions
which they overruled were the decisions about which people
ought ot have been alarmed.
Our United States constitutional history may be divided into
eight periods: (1) The Constitutional Convention, (2) The
Bill of Rights, (3) The period of Chief Justice Marshall,
extending down to the Civil War, (4) The period of Miller
and Waite, extending to the Eighties, (5) The period of Field,
Fuller, and Peckham, extending to about 1910, (6) The period
of Holmes, Brandeis, Hughes, and Stone, extending to 1922,
(7) The period of Butler, McReynolds, Sutherland, and Van
Devanter, extending through 1936, (8) The period of Car-
dozo, Brandeis, and Stone since 1936. The last six periods
are all judicial periods. When the period since March 29,
1937, is compared with these other periods, it is found to
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resemble the period of Holmes, Brandeis, and Hughes,
and the period of Miller and Waite and to some extent the
period of Chief Justice Marshall. The decisions rendered in
this last period are not in conflict with decisions rendered in
these other earlier periods. The only earlier periods which
the last period does not resemble are the periods of Butler,
McReynolds, Sutherland, and Van Devanter and the period
of Field, Fuller, and Peckham; and its decisions are in conflict
with the decisions in the period of McReynolds, Butler, Suth-
erland, and Van Devanter.
For this reason it can easily be seen that the Supreme Court
in its recent overruling decisions was not destroying the orig-
inal Constitution, nor the Constitution made by the formal
amendments, nor the Constitution made by the Supreme Court
in the third, fourth, and sixth periods, but only the Constitu-
tion made in the fifth and seventh periods, and mostly only
the Constitution made in the seventh period. The Supreme
Court has merely overthrown the dominance of justices Butler,
McReynolds, Sutherland and Van Devanter. If the decisions
dictated by these men in the seventh, as well as their dissents
in the eighth, constitutional period had been more carefully
analyzed by those who have criticized the decisions undoing
their work it would have been realized that they had not
necessarily announced the best constitutional doctrines and
that they were out of line with general constitutional develop-
ment and the work of the greatest justices on the Supreme
bench; and more sympathy and less resentment would have
been shown towards the attack of President Roosevelt on the
Court, while disapproving of his methods. In reality he was
not attacking the Supreme Court as a tribunal but only the
decisions of Justices Butler, McReynolds, Sutherland, and
Van Devanter. Happily or unhappily the dominance of these
men has at last been overthrown, and henceforth our Con-
stitution is likely to grow and develop along the lines marked
out by justices with a very different viewpoint as to the func-
tion of a constitution.
Both Mr. Hogan and Mr. Jackson have taken indefensible
positions. The trouble with Mr. Hogan was that he showed
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familiarity only with the decisions of Justices Butler, McReyn-
olds, Sutherland, and Van Devanter. Anybody believing in
the wisdom of these decisions would naturally show the hysteria
which Mr. Hogan manifested. But if Mr. Hogan had read
all the decisions of the Supreme Court instead of the decisions
of these four justices, he might have found more cause for
alarm over the decisions which were overruled than in the deci-
sions which did the overruling. Mr. Jackson took a position
exactly opposite to that of Mr. Hogan. He was filled with
pride over the work of th eSupreme Court during the last three
years, but he was filled with pride because he thought that
these recent decisions of the Supreme Court were simply
removing the successive layers of oil which had been spread
over the original Constitution and taking us back to a genuine
masterpiece welcomingly restored. Unfortunately for this
position, these recent decisions do not take us back to the
original Constitution but only to a judge-made Constitution,
although too that judge-made Constitution made by such
Justices as Marshall, Story, Taney, Miller, Waite, Holmes,
Brandeis, Hughes, Cardozo, and Stone instead of by such
Justices as Butler, McReynolds, Sutherland, and Van De-
vanter.
